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{83 C.Jd 1135; .7 CaLRptr. 780. «III P.Jd lOll 
[Crim. No. 9272. In Bank. Dec. 6,1965.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.· JOSEPH H. 
THAYER et at, Defendants and Appellants. 
(1] Searches and Seizures-Search Warrants-Seizure of Endell-
tial7 Matter.-There is no special sanctity in papers, as dis-
tinguished from other forms of property, to render them 
immune from search and seizure where they fall within the 
scope of principles as to what property may be seized; private 
papers that are instruments of crime may be seized. 
[2] Icl.-8earch Warrants-Seizure of Evidentiary Matter.-The 
rule that mere evidence of crime, as opposed to contraband or 
instruments or fruits of crime, cannot be seized under a war-
rant or otherwise is rejected by statute. (Pen. Code, § 1524, 
subd.4.) 
IS] Oourts-Decisions-Relatiollship of Oourts-Federal and State. 
-Federal rules based on the supervisory power of the U.S. 
Supreme Court over the administration of justice in the federal 
courts are not binding on the states. 
[4] Searches and Seizures-8earch Warrants-Seizure of Eviden-
tial7 JIrIatter.-The rule that mere evidence of crime, as op-
posed to contraband or instruments or fruits of crime, cannot 
be seized under a warrant or otherwise is not a constitutional 
standard and has no application in California. 
[6] Id.-8earch Warrant&-Seizure of Evidelltiary Matter.-":'Even 
if the mere evidence rule were a constitutional standard, it 
would not require the exclusion of a doctor's medical care 
records seized pursuant to warrant in a prosecution for sub-
mitting false claims to a bureau of public assistance for treat-
ment of patients whose medical care was paid by the bureau 
where the records were instruments of crime, the doctor's 
employees testifying to use of the records to draft the fraudu-
lent claims. 
[6] Id.-8earch Warraats-8eizuioe of Evldelltiary Matter.-Even 
if there were a rule protecting privacy by preserving private 
papers from any seizure it would not prevent the seizure of 
business files, such as the medical records of a doctor accused 
of submitting fraudulent claims to a bureau of public assistance 
for treatment of patients whose medical care was paid by the 
bureau where the medical records were freely open to the 
doctor's employees. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, 112; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures (1st ed § 14). 
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2,4, 6] Searches and Seizures, §§ 11, 
86; [3] Courts, §l06; [5] Searches and Seizures, § II 
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APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los:. 
Angeles County and from orders denying new trials. Herbert·~ 
V. Walker, Judge. Judgments aflirmed; appeals from orders.~ 
d
i
:::tion for submitting and for conspiring to SUbmi~;l" 
fraudulent claims for payment for medieal services allegedly·' 
rendered to welfare patients. Judgments of conviction af-
:firmed'l 
Ball, Hunt" Hart, Joseph A. Ball and Harman 14. Bitt: 
for Defendants and Appellants. 1 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,j 
Assistant Attorney General, and Jack K. Weber, Deputy i 
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendants Thayer and Magruder were 
convicted of 22 counts of violating section 72 of the Penal 
Code by submitting false and fraudulent claims to the Bureau 
of Public Assistance of Los Angeles County and of conspiring 
to submit such claims. They appeal from the judgments on 
the sole ground that records used as evidence against them 
were unconstitutionally obtained. 
Defendant Thayer is a physician; defendant Magruder is 
his office assistant. Dr. Thayer treated patients whose medical 
care was paid for by the Bureau of Public Assistance. For ! 
each patient he submitted a "medical care statement" to the 
bureau and certi1led thereon that he had performed the serv-
ices described, that the amount was due and unpaid, and that 
the stated fee represented the entire charge for services to 
the patient. 
At the trial, the prosecution sought to prove that the bureau 
was billed for services never performed and for services also 
billed to others. It introduced into evidence medical care 
statements submitted to the bureau and corresponding medical 
care records taken from Dr. Thayer's :files under a search 
warrant. Charges for visits and treatments on the statements 
were not shown in Dr. Thayer's records. In addition, many 
of the records contained illegible scrawls or wavy lines cor-
respondihg to items billed on the statements. Several of pr .. 
Thayer's employees testified that they used these records in 
preparing the statementsl and that they were instructed to 
show at least four visits on each statement whether or not 
•. there had been that many visits. There was also testimony 
,.) 
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that the wavy lines were written by D:t. Thayer to indicate 
. visits or treatments that were to be billed to the bureau even 
though they had never occurred. 
Defendants contend that the seizure of the records and their 
use as evidence constituted an unreasonable search and seizure 
and a violation of their privilege against self.incrimination 
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of 
the California Constitution. They urge that the records could 
not be _ seized even under a warrant concededly authorized 
by statute (Pen. Code, § 1524), because they were merely 
evidence of crime and not contraband, instruments of crime, 
or fruits of crime. 
The asserted rule that mere evidence cannot be seized under 
a warrant or otherwise is condemned as unsound by virtually 
all the modern writers. It is typically described as "unfor-
tunate" (8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) 
§ 2184(a), pp. 45-46) and is a commonly-used example of a 
legal absurdity. (See, e.g., Kamisar, Public Safety v. Indi-
vidual Liberties: Some "Faots" end "Theones" (1962) 53 
J.Crim.L., C.&P.S. 171, 177; Kaplan, Be arch and Seizure: A 
No-Man's Land in tlte CriminaZ Law (1961) 49 Cal.L.Rev. 
474, 477-479; Comment, Limitations on Seizure of II Eviden-
tiary" Objects: A RuZe in Bearch of e Reason (1953) 20 
U.Chi.L.Rev. 819; Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the 
Fifty States, 1962 Duke L.J. 819, 380-831.) Although often 
invoked in cases involving the seizure of papers, the rule is 
not limited to papers at all but purports to prohibit the 
seizure of any object that is merely evidentiary. The rationale 
for this curious doctrine has never been satisfactorily articu. 
lated. It creates a totally arbitrary impediment to law en-
forcement without protecting any important interest of the 
defendant. A person has a constitutional right to be secure 
from unreasonable searches and seizures by the police. When 
the search itself is reasonable, however, it is impossible to 
understand why the admissibility of seized items should 
depeDll on whether they are merely evidentiary or evidentiary 
plus something else. The rule seems to have its basis in prop-
erty concepts,.in a theory that the sovereign may seize only 
those objects that it is ilJegal to possess, or to which the 
sovereign may assert a claim bl!C&use they have been wrong-
fully obtained or used. (GouZed v. United Btates (1921) 255 
U.S. 298, 309 [41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647].) The modern 
view, however, is that the exclusionary rules of evidence exist 
) 
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primarily to protect personal rights rather than property 
interests and that common-law property concepts are usually 
irrelevant. (.Tones v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 266 
[80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 78 A.L.R.2d 233].) Determining 
the admissibility of evidence on the basis of the sovereign'. 
right at common law to replevy the items is anachronistic. 
It inevitably gives rise to technical rules that are entirely 
unrelated to the real issues of individual privacy and law 
enforcement that are involved. 
Although property notions fathered the rule, some of the 
opinions imply that its major purpose is to prevent explora- : 
tory searches. (See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz (1932) 
285 U.S. 452, 465-466 [52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 
·775].) If that is the purpose of the rule, it is certainly not 
its effect. The rule does not prevent exploratory searches at 
all; it prevents the seizure of mere evidence in the course 
of any search, reasonable or unreasonable, specific or general. 
It has also been suggested that the rule protects privacy by 
preserving a man's most private papers from any scrutiny 
or seizure, however reasonable. (Comment (1953) 20 U.Chi. 1 
L.Rev. 319, 327.) The difficulty with this rationale is that 1
11
, 
the rule protects, not private papers, but mere evidence. 
[1] "There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished ! 
from other forms of property, to render them immune from 
search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the 
principles of the cases in which other property may be seized. " 
(Gouled v. United States (1921) 255 U.S. 298, 809 [41 S.Ot. 
261,65 L.Ed. 647].) Private papers that are the instruments 
of crime, such as a spy's code books (AbeZ v. United States 
(1960) 362 U.S. 217 [82 S.Ct. 683,4 L.Ed.2d 668]) may be 
seized. Finally, it is impossible to sustain the mere evidence 
rule as a corollary of the privilege against self-incrimination. : . 
It is not limited to self-incriminating writings, and when such 'j 
writings are obtained by seizure, instead of by subpoena, the 
defendant does not impliedly admit their genuineness. (See 
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) p. 23; Meltzer, Bequired 
Becord3, tke McCarren Act, and tke Privilege Against Sel/-
Incrimination (1951) 18 U.Chi.L.Rev. 687,700; cf. Boyd v. 
United States '(1886) 116 U.S. 616 [6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 
746].) Moreover, the papers are no less self-incriminating 
when they can be classified as contraband, instruments of 
crime, or fruits of crime. 
[2] In California, the mere evidence rule is rejected by 
statute. (Pen. Code, § 1524, subd. 4.) Defendants contend, 
'however, that Mapp v. Okio (1961) 867 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ot. 
:) 
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1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933], Ker v. California 
(1963) 374 U.S. 23 [83 S.Ot. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726], and 
Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1 [84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 
£53], compel us to accept it. The Mapp and Ker cases held 
that a state must exclude evidence uncovered by an unreason-
able search and that the standard of reasonableness is the 
same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Malloy 
v. Hogan held that the standard for determining the avail-
ability of a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination 
is the same under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
[8] . Federal rules based on the supervisory power of the 
United States Supreme Court over the administration of 
justice in the federal courts, however, are not binding on the 
states. (Ker v. California (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 33 [83 S.Ct. 
1623,10 L.Ed.2d 726].) 
Defendants contend that GouZed v. Vntited States (1921) 
255 U.S. 298 [41 S.Ot. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647], adopted the mere 
evidence rule as a constitutional standard. Although the 
court in Gouled purported to rest its holding on the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments, it did not rely on any specific consti-
tutional language. There are compelling reasons, moreover, 
for not blindly accepting that opinion at face value. Mapp v. 
Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. 643, created problems that were totally 
unforeseen in 1921, when the GouZed opinion was written. 
The court that decided GouZed could not have known that 
basing its decision on the Constitution, rather than on the 
court's power to prescribe rules of evidence for the federal 
courts, might one day have the consequence of imposing the 
rule upon the states. Ker v. California has now recognized 
that the purpose of the distinction between constitutional and 
supervisory rules is to separate fundamental civil liberties, 
which the states must respect, from federal procedural rules, 
which the states may ignore. Opinions written before this dis-
tinction assumed its present crucial importance may have 
to be reinterpreted in the light of "the demands of our federal 
system." (Ker v. California, supra, 374 U.S. at p. 33.) 
GouZed v. V.Ued States is a particularly apt candidate for 
such reinterpretation, for its adoption of the mere evidence 
rule as a constitutional standard was not necessary to the 
result in the case. The validityl of a warrant authorizing the 
seizure of materials stipulated to be merely evidentiary was 
challenged. The federal statute under which the warrant was 
issued authorized seizure only when the property was "stolen 
or embezzled" or "used as the means of committing a felony. " 
- ') 
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(40 Stat. 228.) Instead of basing its decision on the statute 
the court said that the search and seizure violated the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments. Perhaps it meant no more than that " 
the seizure was unconstitutional because seizures that exceed 
statutory authority are always unreasonable. 
The Supreme Court itself has not treated the GouZed role 
as a fundamental constitutional standard. Although the role 
is now set forth in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
rule 41(b}, the court has refused without explanation to apply 
it to evidence other than tangible objects, such as that ob-
tained by electronic devices designed to intercept ~onversatioDS, 
although no policy reason for the distinction suggests itself. , 
(On Lee v. United States (1952) 343 U.S. 747, 753 [72 S.Ct. 
967, 96 L.Ed. 1270).} No Supreme Court case since GouZed 
has excluded evidence solely because of the Gouled role. The 
rule has been distinguished nearly out of existence by the 
instrumentality exception. The GouZed case recognized that 
instruments used in the commission of crime may be seized 
because of the public's interest in preventing their use in sub-
sequent crimes. This policy, however, furnishes no justification 
for the use of the instrument as evidence if such use would 
otherwise violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. It is 
not necessary to use the instrument as evidence to prevent 
its use in future crimes. Sending the owner to prison may 
prevent future crimes, but this consideration applies to mere 
evidence as well as instrumentalities. The same might be said 
of the other categories of evidence that may be seized, contra-
band and the fruits of crime. Certainly the sovereign or the 
rightful owner may replevy such items, but why the admission 
of evidence should turn on the law of replevin is a mystery. 
(See State v. Bisaccia (1965) 45 N.J. 504 [213 A.2d l85].) 
Nor is it clear by what means it can be determined whether 
or not an object is the instrument or fruit of crime until the 
owner's guilt or innocence is determined at the trial. 
Thll first Supreme Court case to interpret the Gouled rule 
was also the first case to use the instrumentality exception 
to restrict its scope severely. In Marron v. United Statu 
(1927) 275 U.S\ 192 [48 8.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 23l}, federal 
officers lawfully entered a saloon and observed illegal sales 
of liquor. They then arrested the employees and patrons, and 
seized a business ledger and some utility bills. The search 
and seizure were held reasonable because they were incident 
to an arrest, and the ledger and bills were admitted into evi-
dence. The court met the assertion that the Gouled rule re-
quired their exclusion by holding that utility bills and business 
; .... ) 
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. accounts are convenient if not necessary for conducting an 
.. illegal liquor business and are therefore ileizable instrumen-
talities of the crime. No one claimed that seizure of the 
ledger and bills would in any way prevent future crimes 
except by enabling the government to obtain convictions. 
It is contended that the Supreme Court retreated somewhat 
from this position in United States v. Lefkowitz (1932) 285 
U.S. 452 [52 S.Ct. 420,76 L.Ed 877,82 A.L.R. 775J.ln Lef-
kowitz, as in Marron, federal agents raided an illegal liquor 
business and seized a number of items, including business 
records and utility bills. The difference was that in Lefkowitz 
the officers did not limit themselves to seizing items plainly 
visible, but made a thorough search of the drawers, cabinets 
and waste-baskets. The court suppressed the evidence because 
the search was too broad. and because the items seized were 
mere evidence. The manner in which Marron v. United States 
was distinguished, however, hardly served to reinforce the 
GouZed rule. In Marron, the court said, the search was 
reasonable and the items were held to be instruments of the 
crime. Since the items seized and the offense charged were 
almost precisely the saine in both cases, the distinction between 
the two cases was only the scope of the search. When the 
search was so broad as to be exploratory in nature, the mere 
evidence rule was resurrected as an alternative (and super-
fluous) ground for exclusion. When the search was otherwise 
reasonable, the same items beeame instruments of crime. 
.Marron and Lefkowitz set the pattern for future treatment 
of the GouZed rule in the Supreme Court. Althougll the rule 
was never expressly repudiated, evidence was never suppressed 
because of it. In nearly every case the central issue was the 
legality of a search incident to an arrest. (Davis v. United 
States (1946) 328 U.S. 582,595 [66 S.Ct.1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453J ; 
Zap v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 624, 632-633 [66 S.Ct. 
1277, 90L.Ed.1477]; Harrisv. United States (1946) 331 U.S. 
145, 154 [67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399J ; Abel v. United States 
(1960) 362 U.S. 217, 234-238 [80 S.Ct.683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668J.) 
A typical treatment of the rule is found in Zap v. United 
States, BUpra, in which the disputed issue was whether incrimi-
nating evidence (a check) could be seized in the course of 
a search to which the defendant had consented by contract. 
The court held that since the search was lawful the agents 
could have copied the check find used the copy as evidence; 
therefore no purpose would be served by holding that consent 
to the search was not also consent to the seizure. (328 U.S . 
• c.tcI-41 
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at pp. 629-630.) The dissent raised the mere evidence rule, 
but appeared to assume with the majority that the check could. 
nonetheless be seized under a warrant. (Id. at pp. 623-633.):~ 
While Zap v. United States does not expressly abolish the' 
rule, it saps it of all vitality. To say that the prosecution 
could introduce copies of Dr. Thayer's records but not the 
originals would be nonsense. "There is no war between the' 
Constitution and common sense." (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 867 
U.S. 643, 657 {81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 
933].) 
Thus the Gouled rule is often cited but no longer applied., 
Its claim to constitutional standing rests on a single case in ", 
which it was not necessary to decide any constitutional issues. '1' 
It ,has been distinguished to the point of extinction in subse- " •• 
quent opinions by the use of technical exceptions and without "" 
discussion of policy. It is universally criticized by the writers, • 
and lacks a clear basis in any constitutional language. Ker v. 
Oalifornia, which was concerned with entirely different sub- •• \ 
stantive issues, contains no indication that such a dubious ' 
technical rule will be imposed upon the states. [4] We hold I 
that the mere evidence rule is not a constitutional standard ! 
and has no application in California. Other state courts that 
have recently considered the matter have come to the same ' 
conclusion. (State v. Bisa,ccia (1965) 45 N .• J. 504 [213 A.2dl 
185] ; People v. Oarroll (1964) 38 Mise.2d 630 [238 N.Y.S.2d A1 
640].) 
[5] Even if the mere evidence rule were a constitutional 
standard, it would not require the exclusion of Dr. Thayer's'j~ 
medical care records, for they were the instruments of crime. ,~ 
The employees testified that they used the records to draw ~ 
up the fraudulent statements. In some cast's Dr. Thayer placed 1 
wavy lines on the records to indicate tbat false billings werei 
to be made. Under the circumstances, these records were more '~ 
instrumental in the commission of the crime than were the' 
utility bills and ledger in Marron v. United States, supra,! 
275 U.S. 192, and the code books in Abel v. United States, ,'~ 
S1lpra, 362 U.S. 217. {See also Matthews v. Oorrea (2d Cir. :~\i., 
1943) 135 F.2d 534; Landau v. United States Attorney (2d ,~ 
Cir. 1946) 82 F.2d 285, cert. den. 298 U.S. 665 [56 S.Ct.,,;tl 
747,80 L.Ed. 1389].) :A 
[8] Finally, it should be noted that there are some opinions 1 
that construe G01tled v. United States to protect privacy by"" 
preserving private pape11l, such as a personal diary, from any .:~ 
seizure. (Davis v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 582, 595 
) 
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[66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453] {Frankfurter, J., dissenting] ; 
United States v. Boyette (4th Cir. 1962) 299 F.2d 92; United 
States v. Stern (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1964) 225 F.Supp. 187.) This 
construction is contrary to the opinion of the court in Gomed, 
but even if there is such a rule, it would not prevent the 
seizure of business files such as the medical records in this 
case, which were freely open to the doctor's numerous em-
ployees. That business records are not constitutionally pro-
tected from properly authorized searches and seizures is indi-
cated not only by Marron v. United States, supra, 275 U.S. 
192, and Zap v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. 624, but also 
by the doctrine that records that are required by law to be kept 
are not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. 
(Shapiro v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 1 [68 S.Ct. 1375, 
92 L.Ed. 1787].) 
The judgments are affirmed. The appeals from the non-
appealable orders denying motions for a new trial are dis-
missed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J.,and 
Burke, J., . concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied January 
5,1966. . 
